CONCLUSION

National Citizenship and *Italianità* in Historical Perspective

Invited to define the Italians, students at Princeton replied: "artistic, impulsive, passionate."[1] This is a stereotype that, together with many other formulas such as "the Italian is good, [...] bright, [...] lazy, [...] an anarchist, [...] a saint, a hero," is not infrequently heard when trying to capture the "Italian character."[2] Leaving aside these curious portraits, and having reached the end of our voyage (the *ad quem* of our research), we now draw some conclusions and discuss fully the vision(s) of Italian national identity that emerge from analysis of the citizenship policies and related official discourse carried out in our history.

To this purpose, we will go back to the two metaphors introduced at the start (i.e., citizenship as a mirror and citizenship as a pencil) because it is through them that we have written this political history of Italian citizenship, and it is through them that we finally provide and discuss the full details about notions of Italianness. The first metaphor (citizenship as a mirror) has given us guidance to answer an important question: What types of national self-identification are reflected, as a mirror, in appropriating and applying certain differentiated membership policies by Italian authorities, and in the political debates pertaining to the status of the Italians from monarchical subjects to republican citizens and throughout the liberal and the fascist eras of their national history? In other words, which traditions of nationhood and which concepts of the nation have clearly shaped in the peninsula contingent adoption of certain citizenship strategies, the choice of a particular policy, the running of a discussion?

Second, and moving from mirrors to pencils, the other metaphor has provided us with assistance and support to answer a further historical question of significant importance. Since citizenship norms, legislation and debate can be a useful pencil for the historian in attempting to sketch and give form to meanings of being Italian, what findings analyzed in the

longue durée are of particular significance in this respect? Put differently, as Italian national citizenship evolved from 1861 to 1950, how did the contours, the boundaries and the content of Italianness change, develop, adjust and end up defined in the historical epochs under consideration? National citizenship, understood both as status in law and as practice, can indeed be a mirror and a pencil for the scholar and be used as such in order to comprehend, today, notions of national identity in historical perspective. Bearing these two allegorical arguments in mind, let us start our concluding discussion.

The historical sources pertaining to the first years of national statehood (1861–1866) constitute a rich reservoir of civic aspects for understanding the origins of post-unification Italianness. As we saw in Chapter One, in 1861 the peoples of the peninsula were unified around one and the same notion of monarchical allegiance, and transformed into Italian subjects sharing one and the same state, one and the same monarch. The contours and content of *italianità* therefore started being defined and shaped in monarchical, territorial and geographical terms—more particularly, in reference to the Savoy kingdom, which from 1859 was extending its borders and was ultimately to change its name from Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia to Kingdom of Italy once national unification had been achieved. This means that the origins of the national notion of Italianness are marked in a fundamental way by the process of statehood that took place, both from a historical and a juridical point of view. Also, this clearly indicates that among the first important defining features of Italian national self-identification, one should highlight the unifying figure of the king and the existence of a historic territory. The first aspect—the unifying role of the Crown—refers to the historical function of the monarchy as a national cement binding all the Italians together, bearing in mind the specific, and often divisive, regional contexts of the country, as well as referring to the contribution of the monarchical institution to development of a national identity within large sections of the population.[3] Regarding the second aspect—the historic land—one can well agree with Smith's point that "the earth in question cannot be just anywhere; it is not any stretch of land. It is, and must be, the 'historic' land, the 'homeland', the 'cradle' of our people."[4] In our Italian case study, it is the peninsula—although in 1861 it was a "truncated" peninsula.

This concept of being Italian, as it began to emerge following unification and the birth of Italian monarchical subjecthood, took on a peculiar profile during the first years of Italy's national history since it was simultaneously one and many, unique and multiple, uniform and variable,

stretching over the entire post-unification Savoy state, and yet changing its contours according to the juridical landscape of the cacophonous citizenship rules inherited from the Restoration period and kept in force until 1865. The fact that the provisions concerning *jus soli*, naturalization and loss of subjecthood, to name just a few, were applied according to geography points to an important identity issue because, under these circumstances, the interrelated notions of *italiano* and *straniero* were being fashioned in an uneven and nonhomogeneous way.

In effect, since in juridical terms it looked as if there were "many national citizenship(s) and many *italianità*" rather than "one national citizenship and one *italianità*," our case study might indeed seem *sui generis*, especially if analyzed from the perspective of nation-statehood. Clearly, the existence and persistence of heterogeneous and chaotic citizenship provisions was, to say the least, atypical and not advisable within a context of political union because the populations of the peninsula, divided already from the point of view of linguistic dialects, regional cultural traditions and economic-social geography, were additionally separated by invisible civic borders, making the Italians almost foreigners among themselves. This is why introduction of a national civil code, inclusive of uniform citizenship norms valid for all, was seen as an additional state instrument to start "making the Italians" and strengthening the interrelated processes of statehood and nationhood.

When this citizenship unification was achieved in 1865–66, one further factor occurred and should be highlighted because it draws additional fascinating contours around the notion of *italianità*. This important aspect refers to the principle of descent not being contemplated at the time in an exclusive way; as we saw, Italy diluted it in 1866 with an important level of territoriality that, by contrast, was not taken into account in post-unification nineteenth-century Germany. So, in this respect, we can well argue that the lines defining the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion, as drawn by the Italian civil code, were more inclusive than those emerging from the citizenship norms of the German counterpart pertaining to the children of non-Germans born in Germany.

Hence the findings at our disposal regarding the origins of Italian monarchical subjecthood (1859–1866) contain a number of initial elements to shed light on the topic of our inquiry. During those first years of Italian history, national identity was at its inception on the peninsula and was therefore in the making. As we have demonstrated, major components were significantly framing its foundation, among them the presence of a unifying monarchical link, reference to the geographic Italian boot and formulation of a national membership status based on descent but also open to *jus soli*. However, we also saw that this unifying and in-the-making Italian nationhood was by no means uncontested. In fact, it had

to compete from the very beginning with a variety of divisive discourses that touched on racializing arguments about internal Otherhood when referring to the perceived uncivilized status of the Southerners and to their non-Italianness.

If we now turn to the history and evolution of national citizenship throughout the liberal decades (1866–1922), further civic developments and details can be discerned. This citizenship evolution was examined and discussed in the four chapters of Part One, devoted respectively to female citizens and their male counterparts within the liberal state, the immigrants of the Italian kingdom, its emigrants and its nonmetropolitan populations. The historical evidence pertaining to these four themes is also particularly revealing when thinking and talking about notions of being Italian. For instance, as we have noted, during the liberal age Italian women went through a differentiated civic path compared to men, in terms of nationality matters and content of *status civitatis*. As a result, the invisible juridical cord, linking female and male citizens to the same state, differed according to historical gender considerations. This finding clearly indicates that from the point of view of national self-identification, both women and men were Italian, but no liberal government would be ready or willing to give full legal recognition to females' national identity in the capacity of spouse and parent. Moreover, the fact that in the sphere of rights Italian female nationals were usually held to be inferior points again to a separate notion of Italianhood when referring to exercise and content of citizenship as practice. This is why, as emphasized in our historical account, the notion of national identity, drawn and shaped by the citizenship pencil of the numerous norms analyzed in the chapter, but also reflected as a mirror in the related discourses regarding women, had a significant gender flavor that merits being made visible in comparison as well with the British and French case studies.

Though holding differentiated status in the quality of Italians, women also shared with their male counterparts a notion of national identity that was subject to further racialized discursive representations. In particular, we saw that throughout the liberal decades the Italians of the South, no matter whether female or male, continued to be pointed out as inferior and semibarbarous strangers, belonging to a primitive Mediterranean race in opposition to a northern Aryan element. Likewise, the unifying idea of Italianness was challenged, on another front, by the aggressive language of anti-Semitic prejudices circulating in certain quarters of the peninsula; as a result, female and male Italian Jews were not unanimously seen as full Italians but actually perceived and portrayed by

some co-nationals as a suspicious foreign race, undeserving of its citizenship emancipation.

Different but also similar *qua* national citizens, Italian women and men shared the same external Others—the same "special foreigners" to look to for similar traits of national identification, and also the same "outright foreigners" from whom to differentiate themselves, together, as a nation in the making. This was illustrated through our analysis of the differentiated citizenship policies and lively debates of the liberal years vis-à-vis the *Italiani non regnicoli*, on the one hand, and the non-Italian immigrants on the other. As we saw, the official discourses pertaining to the definition of the former category reflected a variety of components of Italian nationhood that are very useful within our present discussion in order to grasp the multidimensionality of Italian national identity. To start with, the image of the *non regnicoli* clearly reveals a "pre-political" vision of national self-identification, as well as a "counter-state model" of nationhood rather than a "state-framed" type. In other words, it mirrors an Italian *natio* whose existence preceded creation of the 1861 state, one that, rather than being congruent with and territorially framed by the latter as in France, was conceived as distinct from, and often in opposition to, the existing state entity, as in Germany.[5] Historically, the Italian nation—in search of a state—shared this "pre-political aspect" with its German counterpart since in both countries the "imagined community of nationhood" and "the realities of statehood" were clearly distinct. This was due, on the one hand, to the political fragmentation and the continuous foreign occupations of the peninsula before 1861, and on the other hand to the disparity between the supranational empire and the subnational sovereign units in Germany. Moreover, the two countries' models of national self-understanding shared an analogous "counter-state aspect" within their post-unification history, owing to the "truncated" Risorgimento of the peninsula, which excluded from the 1861 Italian political unification a variety of lands and populations, and to nonincorporation of the German-speaking peoples of Austria and Bohemia by Bismarck's state in 1871.

These Italian national characteristics were reflected in particular in the eloquent speeches of Mancini. The reader will surely remember that for the nineteenth-century professor the citizenship regime followed the nation rather than the political borders of statehood and therefore could well go beyond the latter, should the boundaries of Italian nationhood require it. This explains why in the Italian archives we found that citizenship policies were very generous and assimilationist in regard to the immigrants of "Italian nationality" (meaning here nation membership, and being deprived of any legal connotations) while being simultaneously more restrictive vis-à-vis the non-Italians. Clearly, the official discourses

as well as the differentiated application and adaptation of specific citizenship rules within the particular Italian context reflect idioms of Italian nationhood. Our findings tell us that the political debates, as well as the choice of applying certain rules to the *non regnicoli* and other norms to the other migrants, were shaped and determined in a significant way by notions of the nation. Put it differently, they were not completely autonomous from conceptions of nationhood. This is why, as a mirror, they reflected in this case concepts of Italian national identity.

"Pre-political" and "counter-state," the notion of *italianità* embodied in the figure of the *non regnicoli* was characterized by two further important aspects that must be highlighted. The first concerns the fact that the Italianness of these special Others was defined by making explicit references to ethno-cultural, linguistic, historical and geographical considerations *as well as* to more spiritual factors, such as the patriotic will to live together and contribute, in the case of the "unredeemed populations," to unification of their lands with the "free Italian provinces" of the 1861 Savoy state. This indicates that even though Italian nationhood shared a "pre-political" nature with the corresponding notion of Germanness, it was also distinct from the latter in an important respect. To use Federico Chabod's famous lectures on the "Idea of the Nation," where the Italian professor applied "the naturalistic-voluntaristic dichotomy,"[6] we can say that Germany traditionally had a more ethnic (naturalistic) vision of national self-identification than Italy, while in the peninsula more emphasis was put on voluntaristic connotations. Specifically, whereas the German philosopher and ideologue Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) focused on naturalistic aspects and saw the *Volk* or nation as the possessor of innate and unique characteristics such as language, culture, religion and customs, the Italian counterpart represented by Mazzini defined linguistic traits, culture, history and geography as important objective elements linking men together but never making them a nation if the paramount subjective aspect—the "consciousness of nationality"—was lacking.[7] So, in line with the writings of these ideologues, we can argue that the Italian nation, illustrated by the political discourses pertaining to the *non regnicoli*, was clearly more inclusive and less ascriptive than the German *Volksnation*.[8]

The other aspect worth highlighting is that besides being a blend of ethnic/naturalistic and civic/voluntaristic components, the notion of Italianness personified in the *non regnicoli* enjoyed another peculiarity. It did not have precise borders, precise contours. In fact, apart from incorporating immigrant *Veneti* and *Romani*, Italian nationhood—as evoked in the sources at our disposal—included at times *Goriziani*, *Triestini*, *Istriani* and *Fiumani* as well as the interesting cases of *Maltesi*, *Corsi*, *Tirolesi*, *Nizzardi*, *Ticinesi* and *San Marinesi*, while excluding the *Savoiardi*. The elusiveness of many officials as well as the lack of unequivocal and

unanimous definitions are of particular interest because they leave us with two highly sensitive and debated historical questions. Where does the Italian nation end? What are the precise mental and geographical boundaries of *italianità*? These are historical questions that remained unanswered at the time and that are still open today, particularly when thinking and talking about Italy's Oriental frontiers in the Adriatic and the historical references to nationhood with respect to Zara, Fiume, Pola, the Istrian peninsula and parts of Dalmatia, where a clear-cut line, really, could not then and cannot now be drawn so easily—not even with President Wilson's pen used at the Paris Peace Conference.

Finally, the Italian idiom of nationhood, as clearly reflected in adoption of citizenship policies concerning alienhood and in the conduct of related political debates, must be enriched with a further point of analysis, this time regarding the notion of *italianità* as drawn by the citizenship norms pertaining to the second generations issued from non-Italian immigration and born in the peninsula. As we saw, these provisions became more restrictive in 1912 in comparison with the previous period since Italian citizenship was no longer ascribed at birth under specific conditions on children of foreign fathers but could be acquired only at majority. This aspect represented an important change from the past policies of 1865–66; however, the fact that the territorial tenet was not erased completely from Italian legislation so as to become absent, as in 1913 Wilhelmine Germany, points again to a concept of Italian national identity whose boundaries continued to be shaped in a less restrictive way than in the German example.

Study of citizenship policies regarding immigration was then followed by examination of the civic issues and provisions touching on the large communities of Italian first-generation emigrants abroad and their offspring born and settled outside the peninsula. As we argued, the liberal state found itself confronted with a political and cultural dilemma. How could the "mother country" make sure that its "sons and daughters" (together with their children) would have the least painful process of accommodation and integration in their countries of destination (and birth), but without losing national citizens and weakening the notion of *italianità* abroad?

The most significant factor for our present discussion is that naturalization of the first generations of expatriates and the related loss of Italian citizenship, on the one hand, as well as renunciation of the Italian juridical link by their offspring at majority on the other, were not necessarily seen by Italian officialdom as having a negative impact on *italianità*. Indeed, by applying a double language that shared a similar historical vocabulary with contemporary Germany (i.e. *Staatsangehörigkeit* and *Nationalität*), the Italian state linked theoretically the notion of Italianness to the term

nazionalità (meaning here nation membership and being deprived again of any legal value) and separated it, in this context, from the word *cittadinanza* (referring to juridical citizenship). In this way, it introduced an additional idea into our political history: the sentiment of Italianness not only was linked to national legal citizenship (the latter shaping and having an impact on the former) but could also be detached from it. National identity could therefore be kept alive with or without the juridical bond linking a person to the Italian state. As we saw, this historically interesting but somehow ambiguous national discourse was backed theoretically with Mancini's teachings and with the analogy concerning the *non regnicoli*. In practical terms, it was certainly most welcome, especially from an economic and political standpoint, bearing in mind the fundamental contribution of Italian emigration to alleviating the chronic poverty of liberal Italy and the strategic importance of keeping cultural ties with the diaspora worldwide.

An emigration country throughout the liberal decades, Italy was also a late colonial power. This historical phase, explored in the last chapter of Part One, enriched the notion of Italian national citizenship with a new aspect: a nonmetropolitan dimension incorporating a hierarchical system of membership status granted to Eritreans, Somalis and Libyans, while paying particular attention to the status of the *Dodecanesini* as "special aliens" under military occupation.

This juridical situation embodied the beginning of a gradual transformation of the notion of *italianità* that lasted until 1947. The general concept of Italianhood whose boundaries and content had been shaped by specific citizenship norms and policies since the unification of the country began to take on a particular profile because at the same time that the Italian state incorporated, politically, all the nonmetropolitan populations under its rule, it attempted to categorize them as well as distinguish "the core" (the Italians of the peninsula) from the "periphery" (the natives). The members of the core and the periphery were all subjects of the Italian king. However, they were considered and treated differently on the basis of civilizational and racial considerations. As a result, the notion of Italianness came to involve a complex overseas-colonial facet that was further complicated by the realities of colonial rule.

This point can actually be grasped and further illuminated by making reference to some specific findings. For instance, we have seen that the liberal state continued to apply the *jus sanguinis* rule at home and abroad, including in the colonial setting; thus Italian citizenship was conferred on the mixed-race children of the Italian colonizers who were either born within legitimate unions or recognized by the male metropolitan parent. Many of these children were actually abandoned, but the legal possibility and even the encouragement by the liberal state to

recognize the mixed-race progeny and grant them Italian citizenship are important political and juridical factors to highlight because they point to the fact that the notion of *italianità*—as drawn by this specific civic policy—was slowly evolving, although still only on paper, to adjust to the new social and cultural context. From a theoretical point of view, the idea of Italianness was being stretched to accommodate, alas with difficulty, those mixed-race children who, born in the colonies, necessarily held a complex double identity, spoke more than one language (Italian, Amharic, Arabic), could well have a Catholic father and a Christian Copt mother, and very often were victims of social or psychological exclusion within the community of one or of both parents, especially in East Africa, where they were perceived as "too dark to be Italian" or "too pale to be African."

Second, by analyzing the official discourse pertaining to the nonmetropolitan peoples of liberal Italy, we were able to appreciate other revealing aspects that can again cast a different light on the notion under consideration. For example, as the "myth of ancient Rome" was sometimes evoked in the peninsula before 1922 when thinking and talking about civic incorporation of Eritreans, Somalis and Libyans, this means that post-unification Italy found inspiration on several occasions in its Roman past, thus suggesting that the reference to *romanità* was regarded as an important, although not essential and exclusive, defining component of Italianness. Also, the historical image of the Italian maritime republics—found in the sources concerning the Aegean people—points to a notion of Italian national identity whose common myths and shared historical memories touch on a further aspect of the history of the peninsula, namely, its republican maritime tradition. Consequently, we can say that the intellectual evocation of the Idea of Rome illustrates the significance of *romanità* and *latinità* as defining characteristics of Italianhood, and that both the Roman and the maritime republican pasts shed light on the *mediterraneità* of Italian national self-identification.[9] Last and most important, shaped by this unique past and geography, the notion of post-unification Italianness was also enriched with an ideological historical paradigm that drew its origins from liberal imperialism. Consequently, the notion of being Italian (or rather, a metropolitan Italian) before 1922 was complemented with a civilizational facet making those who were part of the core responsible for and having the duty of bringing the periphery to enjoy a higher civilization within "the Italian house." This mission was by no means uncontested, thanks to a certain ambiguity surrounding the notion of civilization in the Italian context; to the "Hamitic hypothesis" making the Italian African subjects not so much different from the Italians of the metropole as part of the same Mediterranean race; to the domestic national issue of uncivilized Italians

civilizing the Africans; and to discourse concerning the distant origins of the Italics either from Aryanism or from Mediterraneanism. As we saw, questions pertaining to the colonizers' national identity through the prism of colonialism had also been discussed across the Channel. However, in comparison with the British imperial counterpart, the colonial dimension of Italian national identity—a blend of Roman, Mediterranean and civilizing components—looked quite pale. This was because Italy, a late colonial power, was still trying to realize its expansionist dream by 1922 while Great Britain had already shaped a notion of common British imperial identity uniting all the populations of its vast empire to the British monarch.

So the sources at our disposal regarding Part One of the book (1866–1922) illuminate the concept of *italianità*, once again through mirrors and pencils. They suggest a vision of Italian national identity that incorporated a specific gender dimension, as explained in the pages concerning female citizenship. They illustrate the "pre-political" and "counter-state" facet of Italianhood—analogous with Germanness—but also a more inclusive nature than the latter because of the Italian emphasis on spiritual, voluntaristic and territorial elements, as discussed in the chapter pertaining to the foreigners living in Italy. They point to a concept of Italianness that contained a peculiar cultural and psychological dimension linked to the word *nazionalità* and not necessarily to (juridical) *cittadinanza*, as shown in relation to the Italian communities living abroad. And they cast light on the metropolitan and colonial contours and content of the notion under consideration, as explored in the pages concerning Italy's expansionism. In short, our findings mirror in some specific respects as well as draw in others a "multidimensional" image of "liberal *italianità*" that defies any simplistic definition, can be grasped in all its complexity by bearing in mind all these components together and, most importantly, was by no means untouched by various racial questions concerning, in different ways, Italian Southerners, Italian Jews, Italian colonial subjects and the historical origins of the Italics.

This multifaceted liberal notion of Italianhood emerging from our political history could not remain the same following the coming to power of Fascism and the revolutionary agenda of the regime. The blend of continuities and discontinuities between the citizenship policies and issues of the liberal and fascist eras was examined and discussed in the three chapters of Part Two devoted to the period from 1922 to 1945—and encompassing, respectively, the membership status of women and men, civic incorporation of all the populations of Mussolini's *comunità imperiale*

and citizenship and identity issues in the peninsula following the armistice with the Western Allies.

The findings concerning these themes, analyzed within their fascist context, are also very instructive in attempting to comprehend the evolution and changes of the concept of Italianness as reflected and shaped according to our two metaphorical arguments. As noted, during the fascist dictatorship Italian women continued to lack that important legal recognition of their national identity, as spouses and mothers, which their female predecessors had also been deprived of. From this viewpoint, throughout the ventennium the notion of being Italian continued to incorporate significant gender tenets when thinking about the female and male halves of the Italian population.

Sharing this peculiarity with the liberal variant, post-1922 *italianità* was characterized by further aspects of comparison as well as contrast with the previous decades. For example, the formulation and implementation by law of a new citizenship component (i.e., prolificacy), touching directly or indirectly on the related issues of birth, sexuality, *jus sanguinis* and marriage, clearly indicates that the notion of Italianness began to undergo a process of fascist transformation, being imbued, in this first case, with the Duce's totalitarian principle of demographic national strength. By contrast, the fact that *maternità* and *paternità* integrated additional gender connotations points again to the shaping of an Italian national identity that, as previously, was evidently different according to sex. Also, as emphasized in the chapter, this civic situation was enriched with certain racial discourses that did not characterize only the late years of the dictatorship but the 1920s and the early 1930s too, although in very different ways and to a very different degree. This racial rhetoric of the early decade touched in particular, as in previous years, on the origins of the Italics and on anti-Semitic prejudices, although not in a systematic manner and without being in the center of public debate or political life. From 1936 onward, then, a radical change took place as political language and related citizenship strategies were infused and saturated with aggressive racist tenets. As a consequence, Mussolini's citizenship rules started redrawing and reshaping the contours of inclusion and exclusion by magnifying the Aryan race, pushing the Jews (as well as other "non-Aryan stocks") outside the boundaries of Italianness, and upholding the idea of an Italian ethnic unity through construction of an "Aryan-Mediterranean type."

These fascist developments had an impact not only on the contours of *italianità* but also on its content. The totalitarian agenda of the regime shaped a new concept of female citizenship, understood here as practice, which like its male counterpart was transformed according to antidemocratic, antiparliamentarian, revolutionary and ultimately radical racist

principles. Being a mélange of new and old repressions, dilemmas, new opportunities and new exclusions, the fascist notion of rights and entitlements began to mold a particular concept of being Italian that once more incorporated significant gender issues, as in the liberal age, but also important old and familiar racial aspects taking a new twist in the late fascist years. In effect, negative images about the Southern citizens continued to circulate in some quarters throughout the ventennium, including in the Duce's Palazzo Venezia; also, anti-Semitic prejudicial preconceptions characterized some official circles, and anti-Semitic civic discrimination was practiced within the cultural sphere from the early 1930s behind the distinguished doors of the Accademia d'Italia. Finally, owing to the radical racist turn of the regime and the coming of World War Two, fundamental breaking points occurred within the history of Italian rights, entitlements and identity, distinguishing early fascist Italy from the late dictatorship as well as late fascism from liberal Italy.

Prolific, fascist in the making and with specific domestic racial idioms, the Italians of the ventennium, as imagined and forged by the regime, came to have a mission: to create, finally, a Second Roman empire made of a multiplicity of native populations living within the orbit of Mussolini's Rome. As we have seen, fascist Italy's expansionist appetite widened the geographical borders of the Italian empire and led to civic incorporation (or special status) not only of the peoples of liberal Italy but also of the Ethiopian natives in East Africa, and of the inhabitants of Mediterranean Europe who lived in Albania, in the occupied French, Monegasque, Greek and ex-Yugoslav lands as well as in the annexed provinces of Dalmatia, Ljubljana and the enlarged *zona fiumana*. Consequently, important changes were taking place as far as the notion of *italianità* is concerned, in its nonmetropolitan and metropolitan variants. In particular, the nonmetropolitan facet (with its African and Mediterranean-European flavors) evolved as it was stretched to integrate new East African and Balkan peoples. Also, the metropolitan component underwent modification since the frontiers of peninsular Italy changed eastward. Obviously, following all these developments and events, the boundaries of Italianness were extended and given a much stronger and clearer Mediterranean tint than before.

Moreover, while expanding geographically and following the borders of an enlarging empire, the notion of what can be called fascist imperial Italianness was complemented with totalitarian and racist ingredients, which, in the overseas territories and new metropolitan lands, paralleled the situation discussed earlier in dealing with female and male citizenship on the peninsula. In particular, we have in mind the fascist tenets affirming Rome's authority and exporting the fascist revolution abroad through introduction of unifying citizenship systems in Libya and in AOI;

abolition of the 1919 Libyan Statutes with the related local parliamentary systems; introduction of new fascist citizenship provisions in Albania; forced projects of italianization implemented in the Aegean islands; the restrictive citizenship norms discussed in reference to the annexed territories of ex-Yugoslavia; and continuities with the liberal years—as far as racial thinking and colonial power relations are concerned—but also the radical breaking points represented by the legislation on *madamato* and *meticciato*.

Finally and most importantly, this fascist notion of *italianità* could not but be based on the myth of *romanità*, which, transformed into a cult, was for the regime the defining characteristic of being Italian. So, whereas the Idea of Rome—as reflected in the political discourses of the time—was an element of continuity within Italy's national self-identification across the liberal and fascist epochs, the position of the Roman paradigm within the multifaceted concept of Italianhood changed radically during the ventennium. It was marginal in liberal Italy; it was central and essential in fascist Italy. Also, it was to be enriched with references to civilization and to the Maritime Republics as in the pre-1922 years, but with a totally different rhetoric that was aggressive, brainwashing . . . fascist.

This complex, revolutionary and ever since debated transformation of pre-1922 "liberal *italianità*" into a "fascistized" new concept lasted for about two decades and was interrupted in July 1943 when Mussolini was dismissed, the fascist regime collapsed and Italian national history set off on a peculiar course. By studying the intense biennium of 1943–1945, we were able to explain how a people holding the same national citizenship, from a juridical point of view, went through months of defining and redefining notions of Italianness. Indeed, what it meant to be Italian during those days was, and still is, a further controversial, contested and sensitive issue. The expression "Italian subjects of the Savoy king" was not to be the same again; the words *patria*, *patriota*, *Italia* and *identità* all had dual and conflicting meanings according to whether they were pronounced or invoked from anti-fascist Italy or from the fascist Republic of Salò. Two radically different Italies were simultaneously being upheld. Clearly, this ideological conflict did not erupt out of the blue since it had actually started during the fascist ventennium, represented for instance by the clandestine activities of the antifascists living in the peninsula and abroad. Also, it comes to our mind that before 1943 it was embodied in the famous battle of Guadalajara during the Spanish civil war, where Italian Blackshirts and soldiers sent by Mussolini to fight alongside the Nationalist forces of Francisco Franco found themselves shooting Italian antifascist volunteers who had joined the International Brigades to fight for the Spanish Republicans. However, it is during the 1943–1945 biennium that these conflicting notions of "fascist and antifascist *italianità*"

emerged fully and took a national, military and political-institutional dimension.

Finally, we also learned from our findings that at the institutional level two contrasting concepts of Italian citizenship were discussed during those months by the successive governments of the South and by Salò authorities. The first Italian citizenship link, which was actually introduced, was purged of its previous fascist, radically racist and totalitarian connotations while waiting for the institutional monarchical-republican issue to be sorted out after the end of the war. The second, formulated from Lake Garda and never approved, was defined not only as republican but also as anti-Semitic and violently racist. In the end, it was the imagined Italy of the multifaceted antifascist camp as well as the new Italian citizenship link introduced by the governments of the South that were to shape post-1945 Italy and its citizenship regime.

The policies, issues and debates pertaining to Part Two of the book (1922–1945) reflect, from one angle, as well as help us draw, from others, a notion of Italian national identity that appears to be more intriguing, complicated and contested historically than the one of the liberal decades. The findings regarding the fascist ventennium up to 1943 point to a multifaceted vision of Italianhood containing some elements of continuity with the liberal era as well as many significant historical discontinuities. In particular, the gender dimension as well as the metropolitan and colonial facets persisted throughout the dictatorship, but most important of all, they took a singular fascist profile that distinguished them from the liberal variant because of the regime's strong emphasis on totalitarian objectives, fascist revolutionary changes, exclusionary ethnic discourses as well as systematic and brain-washing references to *romanità*. Also, since racial talks continued their course throughout the ventennium, Italianness was shaped by notions of race touching on the same pre-1922 categories of peoples we have discussed: Southerners, Jews, colonial subjects, and Italics. The difference, in this respect, with the earlier Italy was of course the systematic indoctrination organized by the regime and the brutally exclusionary policies of Fascism vis-à-vis Africans and the Jews. Subsequently, the findings concerning the 1943–1945 biennium illustrate all the conflicting and dividing meanings of a notion that was being questioned, shaped and reshaped at a crucial point of Italian national history.

"Liberal" at first, and then under a process of "fascistization," the concept of post-1861 Italianness was to adapt and evolve again with the proclamation of the Republic of Italy in 1946 and the birth of a republican citizenship that is the founding pillar of today's *status civitatis* in

Italy. The years 1946–1950 were also full of interesting happenings that can help us conclude our discussion on the notion of *italianità*. For instance, as the monarchical dimension came to an end, a new concept of Italian was being reflected by the citizenship norms pertaining to republican allegiance and loyalty in regard to the constitution and the republican order. Also, as the genesis of Italian republican *status civitatis* was characterized by a gradual geographical juridical shrinking owing to the terms of the peace settlement, we were able to sketch the new contours of the notion under consideration by using citizenship policies as pencils, and see that Italianness was truncated again—with the loss of certain metropolitan lands and populations—as well as deprived of its historical nonmetropolitan colonial dimension. Finally, infused with many democratic tenets, and kept under check for evident reasons of Cold War logic, the content of the juridical link binding the Italians from 1946–1948 onward marked a major break with the fascist past and a significant advancement in comparison with the liberal years, reflecting a further characteristic of post–World War Two national identification.

The artistic, impulsive, and passionate citizens of the peninsula—Italian, European, and holding homegrown traditions of racial thinking—celebrated the 150th anniversary of Italian unity in March 2011.[10] Since 1861 they have gone through a history of national citizenship and identity that continues today through contemporary domestic debates concerning the mounting institutional visibility and racializing language of the Northern League,[11] the unprecedented historical rise of immigration into Italy,[12] and an ever-larger settled population of foreign origins with a right to Italian citizenship.[13] Between mirrors and pencils, our history of national citizenship has shown that *italianità* is by no means a fixed notion; it can be dual, multidimensional, variable in historical perspective and constantly under construction, to borrow an expression from Geoff Eley.[14] Without doubt, it currently faces major challenges and will have to adapt and adjust, as it has done in the past.